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Abstract—In this paper, we demonstrate a recently proposed
security technique for mixed-signal circuits in the context of a
real application. The security technique, called MixLock, is based
on logic locking of the digital section of the mixed-signal circuit
and can be used as a countermeasure for reverse engineering and
counterfeiting. We demonstrate MixLock in an audio application,
where the underlying Σ∆ ADC that digitizes the audio input is
locked. We show the effect that locking has on the recorded audio
quality based on a metric that counts the resultant glitches per
second and by also providing a link where the interested reader
can download and listen to output audio samples for locked and
unlocked versions of the Σ∆ ADC.
I. INTRODUCTION
During its lifetime an integrated circuit (IC) may be sub-
jected to various types of attacks. Fig. 1 shows the different
stages of the lifetime of an IC and attacks that can be put
into effect at each stage. Threats can be categorized into
Hardware Trojans [1], reverse engineering [2], counterfeiting
[3], and side-channel attacks [4], [5]. Hardware Trojans refer
to malicious hardware inserted into the design to leak secret
information, degrade performance or lead to complete mal-
function, i.e., denial of service. Reverse engineering consists
in extracting the netlist and other technological information
of the IC. It is implemented via a series of steps that include
de-packaging, de-layering, imaging, aligning and stitching the
images of the different layers, and software tools for final
netlist extraction. Reverse engineering aims at reducing the
attacker’s technological disadvantage compared to its com-
petitors, producing a cloned counterfeit, or understanding the
design to mount an attack for stealing secret information.
Counterfeiting includes cloning chips and selling them as
original, a foundry overproducing and illegitimately selling
chips beyond the number agreed on in the contract with the
IC design house, a test facility remarking failing chips that
should be discarded and illegitimately selling them with forge
documentation, and recycling used chips that are possibly
aged with degraded performance and reselling them as new.
Side-channel attacks aim at inferring cipher keys and other
sensitive data and secret information or injecting faults in the
computation in order to degrade performance or lead to denial
of service.
The attacks can have serious implications on governments
(i.e., national security threat if attacked chips are deployed
in sensitive sectors, such as defense and infrastructure), on
industry (i.e., loss of revenue due to loss of know-how and
intrusion of counterfeits in the market), and on the society
and consumers (i.e., low-quality counterfeited products).
Hardware security aims at understanding security breaches
in ICs and developing mechanisms for detecting attacks or
Fig. 1. Hardware attacks at different stages of the lifetime of an IC.
preventing them by implementing countermeasures for on-chip
resilience. Hardware security has been studied extensively for
digital ICs recently [1]–[5], but for analog, mixed-signal, and
RF ICs, only a few methodologies have been proposed; the
solution space is still largely unexplored [6], [7].
In this work, we focus on the problem of IC/IP piracy, which
includes reverse engineering and counterfeiting. In particular,
we develop a countermeasure for mixed-signal IC/IP piracy
that is based on design locking. Locking aims at modifying
the design, in order to introduce k key bits. There is only
one valid combination of key bits, i.e. the secret key, that can
result in correct functionality for any input. Otherwise, if an
invalid key is applied, then the functionality will be corrupted
for some or all inputs.
There are various techniques for locking digital ICs, known
as logic locking techniques. The earliest logic locking tech-
niques aimed at inserting key-gates into the design [8], i.e.
XOR and XNOR gates, controlled by the key bits, as shown in
Fig. 2. Researchers are working in parallel trying to show the
vulnerabilities of existing logic locking techniques, proposing
attacks that can break them: (i) The brute-force attack sequen-
tially applies keys until the valid one is found. This attack
can be circumvented by using a large k (typically at least 64
bits); (ii) The SAT attack, the most lethal attack based on a
Boolean satisfiability solver, can recover the secret key with
very reasonable effort; (ii) Removal attacks aim at identifying
and removing the added protection logic, i.e., the gates K1-
K3 in Fig. 2; (iv) Approximate attacks aim at extracting a
key that establishes an incorrect yet approximate functionality.
The most recent state-of-the-art logic locking technique is
Stripped-Functionality Logic Locking (SFLL) [9] and provides
quantifiable resilience against these attacks.
The secret key management scheme is common for all logic
locking techniques and includes storing the secret key on-chip
in a tamper-proof memory or generating it on-chip; in the
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Fig. 2. Random logic locking.
Fig. 3. Locking techniques for analog ICs: (a) obfuscating biasing transistors
[11]; (b) locking current mirrors [12]; (c) logic locking of the digital section
of a mixed-signal IC [13]; (d) logic locking of the digital optimizer in the
calibration feedback loop [14].
latter case, a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) [10] can
be utilized to even produce chip-unique keys. Chip activation
can be done by the trusted design house, which arguably is a
practical solution only for low-volume fabrication. For high-
volume fabrication, activation needs to be done on the test floor
concurrently during automated testing. For protecting the key
against an untrusted test facility, the design house can remotely
activate the chips using asymmetric cryptography [8].
Locking analog ICs is very challenging as the key bits need
to be introduced in a way that nominal performance is not
degraded. To date, four approaches have been proposed, as
shown in Fig. 3. More specifically, in [11], it is proposed to
replace biasing transistors with parallel-connected transistors
whose gates are controlled by key bits. The key bits enable
transistors whose aggregate width equals that of the original
biasing transistor. In [12], extra branches are inserted into
the current mirror, where each branch is comprised of the
mirroring transistor and possibly several switches that are
controlled by the key bits. The resultant biasing circuit will
depend on which branches are switched-on, as well as on
the geometry of the mirroring transistor in these branches.
In [13], the MixLock technique is proposed that locks the
functionality of a mixed-signal circuit via logic locking of
its digital section. In [14], it is proposed to lock the digital
optimizer in the calibration feedback loop such that it provides
the wrong tuning settings. All these locking approaches are
vulnerable to removal attacks since a smart attacker can simply
remove the locked blocks and replace them with “fresh” ones
with no locking mechanism. Perhaps [13] provides the highest
resilience against removal attacks since the design of the
digital section is intertwined with the design of the analog
section, thus replacement by redesign is not straightforward.
In addition, the locking approaches in [11], [12] act on the
biasing of the circuit and, thereby, the attacker does not have
to recover the key; it suffices to recover the biases, which are
typically small in number.
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate MixLock
[13] in a real application context. In particular, we built a
demonstrator that emulates a microphone for capturing a sound
source, signal processing for digitizing the input audio, and a
speaker for listening back the sound source. MixLock is used
to lock the ADC in the signal processing chain. The effect
of locking on audio quality can be measured by the glitches
introduced from the locking operation. The interested reader
can also download audio samples to listen to the effect of
locking.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section
II, we provide a brief overview of MixLock. In Section III,
we describe the demonstrator. In Section IV, we demonstrate
the impact of locking on audio quality. Finally, Section V
concludes the paper.
II. MIXLOCK WITH SFLL
MixLock aims at securing mixed-signal circuits through a
logic locking mechanism applied to the circuit’s digital section
as illustrated in Fig. 3(c). Only when the valid key is pro-
vided the mixed-signal circuit performs its intended function.
Otherwise, for invalid keys the mixed-signal performances are
pushed outside of their specification, i.e., they are locked.
The term analog security is used to quantify the efficiency
of mixed-signal performance locking, while the term digital
security is used to quantify the resilience against logic locking
attacks in the digital domain.
MixLock presents several appealing properties. It is non-
intrusive since it does not alter the analog section, which is
key for its wide adoption by designers. Modifications in the
digital section do not affect mixed-signal performance either.
It incurs low area and power overheads since area and power
are dominated by the analog section which is left intact. It
is fully-automated since logic locking adds only one extra
synthesis step. Finally, this concept is applicable to a wide
range of mixed-signal circuits such as PLLs, RF transceivers,
data converters, etc.
Mixlock provides protection against reverse engineering and
certain types of counterfeiting, namely cloning, overproducing,
and remarking. It can provide protection against recycling if
the key management scheme supports chip-unique keys that
should be loaded every time at start-up.
Breaking Mixlock will require either recovering the secret
key via a logic locking attack or trying to unlock directly
mixed-signal performances by applying an iterative multi-
objective optimization algorithm. The latter is unlikely to suc-
ceed since mixed-signal performances do not show a smooth
monotonic relationship with the key bits. Regarding the former
attack, Mixlock is independent of the underlying logic locking
technique, but to achieve strong digital security Mixlock uses
the state-of-the-art SFLL logic locking mechanism [9].
The architecture of SFLL is shown in Fig. 4 for a digital
circuit with n inputs. A checker is introduced into the design
that flips the output of the original circuit for all input patterns
that are a Hamming distance (HD) h away from the secret key
of k-bits. The secret key is hard-coded and after synthesis the
checker is immersed in the original circuit and, thereby, the
Fig. 4. SFLL architecture for digital circuits.
Fig. 5. Mixlock demonstration in an audio application.
two become inseparable. A restore unit is used that also checks
the HD between the input and the secret key, but this time the
secret key is provided directly at the input of the restore unit.
For example, a possible key management scheme, as explained
in the introduction, is to store the secret key in a tamper-proof
memory, as shown in Fig. 4. The restore unit corrects the
functionality only with the correct secret key loaded in the
tamper-proof memory.
In terms of resiliency against logic locking attacks, it can
be shown that the SAT attack effort required to extract the
secret key is equivalent to breaking a k−dlog2
(
k
h
)
e-bit key in
a brute-force way. The resiliency against the removal attacks
is proportional to the number of protected input patterns, i.e.
the input patterns that produce an erroneous output for an
invalid key; the larger the number of protected input patterns,
the more intricate the changes to the original logic are, and,
thereby, the harder it is for the removal attack to succeed. It
can be shown that the number of protected input patterns is(
k
h
)
· 2n−k. Finally, the resiliency against approximate attacks
is proportional to the error rate or functionality corruption at
the output; the higher the error rate, the more difficult it is to
find a key that establishes approximate functionality. It can be
shown that the error rate is (
k
h)
2k
. As it can be seen from the
resilience expressions above, SFLL allows a designer to trade-
off the desired digital security level against different attacks
by choosing appropriately k and h.
III. Mixlock DEMONSTRATION IN AN AUDIO APPLICATION
In [13], Mixlock was demonstrated on a band-pass (BP)
Σ∆ ADC case study. A Σ∆ ADC is decomposed into a Σ∆
modulator, which is the analog section, and a decimation filter,
which is the digital section. In this case, Mixlock naturally
locks the decimation filter. It was shown that Mixlock achieves
strong analog security based on one thousand randomly chosen
invalid keys; the main Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) perfor-
mance was degraded dramatically below its specification. The
decimation filter was locked so as to guarantee, in addition,
strong digital security.
In this paper, we demonstrate Mixlock in an audio applica-
tion, in order to evaluate the impact of locking on the audio
quality. This demonstrator helps us in essence to listen to the
effect of locking. The demonstrator is illustrated in Fig. 5.
An audio sample is read from the microphone of the PC and
thereafter it is captured and sampled using the Matlab function
audioread. Upsampling based on linear interpolation is
used so as to artificially smoothen the signal so as to be able
to present it to a Σ∆ ADC for a second digitization. The
output of the Σ∆ ADC can be heard directly from the speaker
of the PC using the Matlab function audiowrite. The Σ∆
modulator in this demonstrator is a second-order low-pass (LP)
continuous-time Σ∆ modulator. The decimation filter is the
same one used in [13]. The Σ∆ modulator is modelled in
Simulink, while the decimation filter is modeled with VHDL
and is simulated in Modelsim.
For locking the decimation filter we use the exact same
settings as in [13]. More specifically, SFLL essentially locks
a single bit line stripping the functionality of the sub-circuit
that drives the bit line. For the decimation filter, we experiment
with two different locking approaches applied in the first block
in the digital signal processing chain, which is a comb filter.
The rationale is that in this way errors will be propagated
and spread out to the rest of the circuit, introducing high
functionality corruption. In the first approach, we use a single
SFLL mechanism with k = 128 and h = 15 that locks the
most significant (MSB) bit of the comb filter’s output. This
approach provides a 64-bit resilience against the SAT attack
and sufficient resilience against removal and approximate
attacks, as dictated by the formulas in Section II. In the
second approach, which is called 1.5xSFLL, this first SFLL
mechanism is combined with a second SFLL mechanism with
k = 32 and h = 16 that locks the MSB-1 bit of the comb
filter’s output. 1.5xSFLL increases significantly the number of
protected patterns and the error rate, i.e., it increases function-
ality corruption. In theory, however, 1.5xSFLL can be reduced
to the single SFLL mechanism [13], so it is appropriate only
for the naive attacker. Locking the decimation filter with a
single SFLL mechanism results in an area and power overhead
of 6.7% and 9.8%, respectively, while 1.5xSFLL results in
a slightly higher overhead. No SNR degradation is observed
compared to a design with no locking mechanism.
In this demonstrator, the SNR metric cannot be used for
quantifying analog security as was shown in [13]. The reason
is that SNR requires a sinusoidal input, while audio signals are
time-varying in nature; their spectral contents vary with time,
they are rich in frequencies, etc. For this purpose, we use an
audio quality metric to evaluate the effect of locking, namely
glitches per second (GPS). In essence, unless the valid secret
key is applied to the decimation filter, locking introduces errors
that get translated into audible glitches in the output signal.
IV. RESULTS
Our experiment involves processing audio samples through
the system in Fig. 5 and examining the effect of locking on
the audio quality. Table I shows in the first two columns the
different audio samples that were employed and their duration.
Audio samples include speech recordings in German and
English and professional music recordings of various genres.
The third and fourth columns show the GPS for a locked
Σ∆ ADC using the two locking approaches discussed in
TABLE I
EFFECT OF LOCKING BY MIXLOCK ON AUDIO QUALITY
Audio sample Duration SFLL 1.5xSFLL
[s] GPS [1/s] GPS [1/s]
German Voice (counting) 13 0.0 7046
English Voice (MixLock goal) 4 0.0 7309
Bob Marley - No Woman No Cry 15 0.3 7511
Benny Goodman - Bugle Call Rag 15 0.3 7529
Kenny Ball - I Wanna Be Like You 15 3.1 7559
John Coltrane - Nature Boy 15 0.9 7543
Beethoven - Symphony No. 9 15 0.4 7539
Section III, namely SFLL and 1.5xSFLL. The interested reader
can also download and listen to the output audio samples
from this link: https://nuage.lip6.fr/s/CYowe89aXBe6rsP. The
downloadable archive includes the output audio samples in the
case of the unlocked design, where the valid key is applied,
and two locked designs using SFLL and 1.5xSFLL, where a
random invalid key is applied.
As it can be seen, 1.5xSFLL corrupts dramatically the
audio quality resulting in very frequent glitches. In fact, the
recording gets buried under the noise level and is hardly
recognizable. SFLL results in noticeable glitches for the music
recordings that can be heard as noisy “cracks”. However, for
the voice recordings, no glitches are noticed.
This result can be explained as follows. By default SFLL
corrupts the output of the targeted digital circuit for some and
not all input patterns. In our case, we have n = k = 128
and h = 15, thus the number of protected patterns is(
k
h
)
· 2n−k ≈ 1.32 · 1019, which is a very small subset of
all possible 2128 ≈ 3.4 · 1038 input combinations. An analog
input, i.e., an audio signal in our case, gets translated into
a sequence of patterns at the input of the protected digital
block within the decimation filter. Since music recordings have
higher signal activity compared to voice recordings, it turns out
that they get translated to a larger number of distinct patterns
at the input of the protected digital block. Thus, the probability
of hitting protected input patterns is higher, resulting in a
higher probability of audio quality corruption. Note that short
duration samples were recorded for practical purposes and that
for longer duration samples SFLL is expected to also result in
glitches when voice is processed.
At this point it is important to recall the purpose of hardware
locking and hardware obfuscation in general. The aim is
not necessarily to encrypt the data that is processed by the
hardware, i.e., corrupt audio quality to bare noise. The aim
is to render the hardware low-quality and unusable unless the
valid secret key is known; i.e., glitches occurring at regular
and frequent intervals are sufficient.
Finally, Fig. 6 shows an excerpt of the transient waveform
of the output audio in the case of the English voice recording
stimulus. Two waveforms are plotted for the unlocked design
and the design locked with 1.5xSFLL. The large number of
glitches introduced by 1.5xSFLL can be easily identified.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we demonstrated the effect of locking a mixed-
signal circuit that is part of the signal processing chain in
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Fig. 6. Frequent glitches introduced by 1.5xSFLL in the transient waveform
of an output audio sample.
an audio application. The recently proposed MixLock locking
technique for mixed-signal circuits was used. The effect of
locking is measured by the number of occurring glitches, but
it can be also clearly heard in audio samples that are provided.
We demonstrate that locking results in disturbing glitches,
rendering the device low-quality and unusable unless the valid
secret key that unlocks the design is known. To the best of our
knowledge, this the first demonstrator showing the effect of
locking on a circuit in a way that can be perceived by humans
via a sense.
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